By D. M. Armstrong
A wide-ranging examine of the valuable suggestions in epistemology - trust, fact and data. Professor Armstrong deals a dispositional account of normal ideals and of data of common propositions. trust approximately specific concerns of truth are defined as buildings within the brain of the believer which symbolize or 'map' truth, whereas common ideals are tendencies to increase the 'map' or introduce informal relatives among parts of the map in response to common ideas. 'Knowledge' denotes the reliability of such ideals as representations of truth. inside of this framework Professor Armstrong bargains a particular account of some of the major questions more often than not epistemology - the kin among ideals and language, the notions of proposition, thought and suggestion, the research of fact, the different types of wisdom, and how within which beleifs and data are supported through purposes. The e-book as an entire if provided as a contribution to a naturalistic account of guy.
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Extra resources for Belief, Truth and Knowledge
It is often said, or hinted, that those who lack linguistic competence have beliefs, but have them in some * logically secondary' sense only. The question then arises what this phrase 'logically secondary' means. I can think of three reasonably precise meanings for the phrase. (I would rather have been able to quote some other philosopher's account(s) of the phrase 'logically secondary'. But, to use F. H. ) In what follows I try to show that animal beliefs are certainly not logically secondary cases of belief in the first of these meanings; that some animal beliefs may be logically secondary cases in the second sense; and that it is quite unproven that they are logically secondary in the third sense.
Here we have nine numerically different events (nine numerically different speech-acts). However, we distinguish between a man's asserting and what he asserts. In the case considered, what is asserted is the same thing in each case (and the same as the thing believed in the first case and the possibility entertained in the second case). It is just such a case that philosophers, at any rate, describe by saying that what the nine men all assert is the same proposition. So it is sometimes true that people assert the same proposition.
The * mental proposition' will be logically prior to the 'linguistic proposition'. But whether this suggestion about the theory of meaning is correct or not, it is at least clear, given our previous argument, that the linguistic proposition is not logically prior to the mental proposi- Propositions 43 tion. And since our concern is with belief it is the mental proposition that primarily concerns us. Ill Two Unsatisfactory Accounts of Propositions But now we must ask ourselves what account we are to give of talk about propositions.